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SUMMARY 
Consumers play a crucial role in a firm’s strategic moves. However, the 
literature on mergers and acquisitions (M&As) has overlooked the interaction 
between M&As and consumers. In this paper, we provide a marketing perspective 
by investigating how the response of consumers to M&As influences the 
post-M&A performance of the firm involved. We develop a conceptual 
framework on how M&As affect firm profit through three channels: brand equity, 
cost synergies, and the product portfolio. Next, we use a structural model in 
combination with the difference-in-difference approach to quantify the combined 
effect of these channels on firm profit. We then decompose the combined effect 
into the main effects of each of the three mechanisms, along with their two-way 
and three-way interactions. This approach is applied to assess Lenovo’s 
acquisition of IBM’s personal computer division in China. We find that the 
acquisition raised consumers’ valuation of the Lenovo brand and generated 
significant cost synergies. The increase in brand equity contributed the most to 
increasing Lenovo’s profit, followed by the realized cost synergies and product 
portfolio gains. The gains in brand equity arose primarily from co-branding with 
the “Think Series”, rather than with the “IBM” brand. All three mechanisms 
reinforced each other in improving Lenovo’s post-acquisition profit. 
Keywords:  Mergers and acquisitions; Brand equity; Structural modelling; 
Difference-in-difference method  
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INTRODUCTION 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) play an important role in world 
economy. Their transaction volumes account for more than 2% of the world 
GDP for last twenty years1. Their scale, breadth, and exceptionally high failure 
rate have attracted researchers from various disciplines and government 
agencies. Finance researchers have examined the phenomenon at the level of 
industries. Mergers can be triggered by industry shocks such as resource 
deficiencies, technological innovations, deregulation, and changes in input 
costs (Mitchell and Mulherin 1996), agency problems, and managerial herding 
(Scharfstein and Stein 1990). The strategy and management literature studies 
M&As at the individual firm level, investigating issues such as organizational 
learning, resource dependence, executive departures, cultural conflicts, and 
employee impacts (Capron and Holland 1999; Hayward 2002; Swaminathan, 
Murshed, and Holland 2008). In the field of industrial organization, the search 
for cost synergies or efficiencies is seen as the main reason for firms to engage 
in M&As (Scherer and Ross 1990; Neary 2007). Similarly, as indicated by 
DOJ & FTC 2010, efficiency gains are the primary reason for mergers. Their 
impact on price, innovation and consumer’s welfare is the primary focus of 
agencies investigation of a proposed merger or acquisition. Another reason for 
firms to carry out M&As is to consolidate their product portfolios, since that 
allows them to adopt product line pricing (Nevo 2001). The merged firm’s 
products can be priced more cooperatively to soften competition among 
former rival products and thus increase profit margins. 
                                                              
1 We get this number based M&As volume data from Statista and gross worldwide product data from 
Wikipedia. 
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However, one perspective that has been relatively understudied is the 
interaction between M&As and consumer preference change - M&As could 
change consumer’s brand preference, which will influence firm’s profit. We 
define this as brand equity effect. Consumer’s preference could motivate 
M&As in a few different ways. First, M&As are usually followed by the 
consolidation of brands and product lines, which may lead to positive or 
negative spillover effects in brand perceptions among the acquiring and 
acquired firms (Wernerfelt 1988; Aaker and Keller 1990). Second, the 
acquiring firm will be able to use the acquired firm’s technologies or apply its 
own technologies to the acquired products to improve product quality. Third, 
M&As may generate pride or national pride in the case of cross-border M&As 
among the acquiring firm’s loyal consumers (Chu 2013). These possible 
consequences of M&As may increase the willingness to pay of consumers and 
their demand, which will affect the acquiring firm’s profit. The potential brand 
equity effect can be as significant as the possible cost synergies and broader 
product portfolio effects. Therefore, it is important to understand how M&As 
affect consumer’s preference, and how the changed brand preference affects 
firm profit. 
In this paper, we study the impact of M&As on brand equity, cost 
synergies, and the product portfolio. We develop a conceptual framework to 
depict how these three mechanisms individually and jointly affect firm profit. 
We then demonstrate how structural model and counterfactual experiments 
can be used to quantify the total impact of M&As on profit and decompose the 
impact into the main effects and interaction effects of the three mechanisms. 
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We use the difference-in-difference method to measure the impact of M&As 
on consumer’s preference for the merged firm.  
Empirically, we examine Lenovo’s acquisition of IBM’s personal 
computer (PC) division in 2004. All of the three aforementioned gains were 
likely to be present at the acquisition. First, as an internationally renowned 
brand from the U.S. and the one which made computers available to the 
general public, IBM was perceived by Chinese consumers as being of higher 
quality and thus had higher brand equity than Lenovo (Chu 2013). Since the 
deal allowed Lenovo to co-brand with IBM on Think Series computers for five 
years, the acquisition could significantly enhance the intrinsic preferences of 
consumers for Lenovo, leading to an increase in brand equity. Therefore, a 
positive spillover may ensue. Second, the acquisition increased Lenovo’s 
market shares both inside and outside China. Due to economies of scale in 
procurement, production, marketing and distribution, the deal may have 
generated cost synergies and lowered Lenovo’s marginal costs. Lenovo 
expected to save up to $200 million because of the economies of scale in 
production and its supply chain (Bloomberg Businessweek 2005). Third, the 
addition of the IBM Think Series to Lenovo’s portfolio put the former rivals 
under common ownership. This allowed Lenovo to adopt product line pricing 
and set prices for its original brands and the Think Series jointly to soften 
competition, creating product portfolio gain. 
On the other hand, it is possible that the three gains might not have 
existed. Lenovo might not have been able to increase its brand equity if 
co-branding with IBM did not work, or consumers doubted its ability to adopt 
the Think Series’ advanced technologies to its lower-end PCs. Lenovo spent 
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very little on R&D and focused on low cost production, while premium 
quality and advanced technologies require huge investments in R&D and 
production (Spooner and Kanellos 2004). In addition, Lenovo might not have 
achieved substantial cost synergies, at least in the initial few years. Lenovo 
had two business groups after the acquisition: the Lenovo business group 
(LBG) that was formed of the original Lenovo business, and the Think 
business group (TBG) that managed the acquired IBM Think Series. Goldman 
Sachs found that LBG and TBG procured their PC components separately 
until the middle of 2006 (Zellen 2005). 
We address the following questions in our empirical analysis: 1) Do the 
three gains exist in Lenovo’s acquisition of IBM’s PC division? If yes, how 
large is each gain and what is its relative contribution to Lenovo’s 
post-acquisition profit? 2) Are there any interactions among the three 
mechanisms, and how do they interact? 3) Lenovo’s acquisition of IBM’s PC 
division was a phased takeover, which allowed Lenovo to continue to use the 
IBM logo on the Think Series for five years. However, Lenovo stopped using 
the IBM logo two years earlier than planned. Was this decision economically 
sound? 
Our demand estimates show that there were significant brand equity gains 
for Lenovo: consumers valued the Lenovo brand significantly higher after the 
acquisition. These gains primarily came from the Think Series brand, not from 
the IBM brand, implying that the Think Series was a brand independent of 
IBM. This may explain why Lenovo dropped the IBM logo from Think Series 
computers earlier than scheduled. We also find no dilution of Think Series’ 
brand equity. Our cost estimates indicate that the acquisition generated 5.1% in 
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cost synergies for Lenovo. The product portfolio gains were minimal, 
amounting to about 0.03% of Lenovo’s profit gain. A comparison of the 
substitution pattern before and after the acquisition suggests that the 
acquisition enhanced Lenovo’s market position and made it more competitive 
than all other PC makers in China. 
Our policy experiments show that the acquisition boded well for Lenovo, 
increasing its profit by $2.39 billion ($1.36 billion from LBG and $1.03 billion 
from TBG) in 2005-08, which more than offsets the acquisition costs of $1.75 
billion. Brand equity gains accounted for 37.77% of the incremental profit, 
followed by cost synergies (27.96%). Brand equity gains were the most 
effective profit enhancer: a 2% improvement in brand equity could increase 
profit by 11.42%, while a 5% enhancement in cost synergies only led to 8.45% 
more profit. The three mechanisms reinforced each other to boost Lenovo’s 
profit, with the largest interaction being the one between brand equity and cost 
synergies. 
Our analysis demonstrates the importance of consumer preferences in 
M&As. The merged firm can capitalize on this by actively leveraging 
consumer preferences. More and more firms from the emerging markets are 
engaging in cross-border M&As as a way to expand their business into 
developed markets and/or break their links with their country of origin (Zhang 
2015). For example, BenQ (Taiwan) acquired the mobile devices division of 
Siemens in 2005; Tata Motor (India) acquired Jaguar Land Rover in 2008; and 
Geely (China) took over Volvo in 2010. Our analysis offers insights on the 
motives and potential gains for these cross-border M&As, and our framework 
can be adapted to analyze similar cases. 
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This research makes the following contributions. First, we develop a 
conceptual framework that delineates the three mechanisms through which 
M&As can affect firm profit. In particular, we introduce the role of consumer 
preferences into the study of M&As and assess how M&As affect consumer 
preferences, and its subsequent profit impact. Second, we propose an approach 
to empirically quantify the effect of M&As on firm profit and decompose the 
total effect into the main effects of the three mechanisms and their two-way 
and three-way interactions. Third, we empirically assess Lenovo’s acquisition 
of IBM’s PC division, and find that gains in brand equity were the most 
important and the most effective source for Lenovo’s increase in profit, 
demonstrating the importance of consumers in M&As. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. We review the literature on 
M&As and brand equity and develop our research framework. We then 
summarize the data, set up the model, and discuss the estimation process. We 
next report the estimation results, policy experiments and robustness checks. 
We conclude with a discussion of the results and offer some directions for 
future research. 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Although M&As have been studied extensively in several disciplines, 
little attention has been paid to the role of consumer preferences. The finance 
literature has examined the relationship between merger waves and various 
phenomena, such as stock market valuations, technological shocks, regulatory 
policies, and industrial economics (Mitchell and Mulherin 1996). Agency 
problems and managerial herding can also heighten the focus on M&As 
(Scharfstein and Stein 1990). In the strategy literature, researchers have 
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examined the association between M&As and firm-level issues, such as 
organizational learning, cultural conflicts, and resource deficiencies (Haleblian 
and Finkelstein 1999; Morrow et al 2007). It is worth noting that the role of 
consumer preferences has not been of concern in these two research domains. 
Most relevant studies in the IO literature investigate how cost synergies 
influence a firm’s post-M&A profitability. Salant, Switzer and Reynolds 
(1983) analytically demonstrated that M&As could be unprofitable under 
Cournot competition, even if there are large efficiency gains or cost synergies. 
However, Perry and Porter (1985) argued that the Salant-Switzer-Reynolds 
model was not conceptually well-defined and thus underestimated a firm’s 
profitability. Neary (2007) examined the two basic motives for M&As – a 
search for efficiency and strategic fit – and argued that previous research was 
inconclusive on both. He predicted that cost differences due to technology 
would generate incentives for both of the parties involved in a cross-border 
M&A. Empirical studies on M&As are abundant. Baker and Bresnahan (1985) 
employed a residual demand approach to analyze mergers in differentiated 
markets. However, no consumer decision process is mentioned in their 
framework. Nevo (2000) analyzed the impact of mergers in the ready-to-eat 
cereal industry on consumer welfare, but did not include changes in consumer 
preferences brought about by M&As in his framework. Chu, Chintagunta and 
Vilcassim (2007) found that mergers in combination with channel strategies 
have a larger effect on firm profit than mergers alone, but remained silent on 
the role of consumer preferences in M&As.  
A similar paper is done by Homburg and Bucerius (2005), which looked 
at how the speed and extent of marketing integration influence firm’s 
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post-merger performance. Our paper differs from this paper in several ways. 
Firstly, we use observational data which are consumers’ real choices, instead 
of survey data based telephone interview with managers; Secondly, we 
propose a structural modelling approach to capture the following effects: how 
M&As affect consumer’s brand preference after controlling for price and other 
product attributes, and how the preference change affects firm’s profit. Thirdly, 
we consider interactions among consumers and firms. In sum, our paper uses 
observational data to directly look at the impact of M&As on consumers and 
measure its impact on firm profit, accounting for the interactions between 
consumers and firms. 
The previous paragraphs have highlighted the absence of research on the 
role of consumer preference in M&As. This paper fills this gap by analyzing 
the impact of M&As from the consumers’ perspective. This paper proposes 
the following framework (Figure 1) to study M&As’ impact on firm profit 
through three channels: brand equity, cost synergies, and product portfolio 
effect. These three factors can also reinforce each other in enhancing or 
dampening firm profit. For example, if M&As increase the intrinsic 
preferences of consumers and enhance a firm’s brand equity, this will increase 
the demand for the firm’s products, spurring higher production, which in turn 
will help to bring down the firm’s marginal costs and generate cost synergies. 
Figure 1 Conceptual Framework of M&As and Firm Profit 
 
 
 
Mergers & 
acquisitions 
Brand equity effect 
Cost synergies effect
Product portfolio 
effect
Firm profit 
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We begin by deriving a demand model from the utility maximization 
behavior of consumers. Changes in consumer preferences induced by M&As 
can be captured in the demand model. The impact of changes in a product 
portfolio on firm profit can be assessed through changes in the merged firm’s 
product ownership matrix, while the effect of cost synergies on firm profit can 
be evaluated via the marginal cost function. 
DATA SUMMARY 
The data used in this paper is provided by International Data Corporation, 
a leading marketing research firm. It captures the quarterly sales volumes and 
prices of each PC model provided by all PC players in China from 2001 to 
2008. The acquisition of IBM’s PC division was announced at the end of 2004, 
approved by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States at 
March, 2005, and finished at the end of May, 2005; hence, the dataset covers a 
period encompassing four years before and four years after the acquisition. 
This enables us to assess the impact of the acquisition on firm profit.  
Each record in the dataset consists of the following information: PC 
vendor (such as HP, Dell, and Lenovo), PC brand (such as Pavilion, Inspiron, 
and Portege), form factor (desktop, laptop, or ultraportable), distribution 
channel (including dealers/value-added resellers, direct inbound by 
telephone/fax, direct outbound by salesforce, internet, retail, or others), CPU 
(central processing unit) maker (Intel, AMD or other brands), CPU brand 
(such as Pentium, Core, and Athlon), CPU speed, number of cores (single, 
dual, or quad), price, and units sold. Table 1 provides a summary of the data. 
Average PC prices decreased from $1,325 in 2001 to $747 in 2008, and PC 
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sales per year grew from 9.59 million units to 39.57 million units. Over the 
years, CPUs became faster and the number of cores in them increased.  
Table 1  Summary Statistics 
CPU Speed(GHz) No of Cores Price Sales by Units 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD  
2001 1.20 1 1 0.74 1324.81 619.84 9587956 
2002 1.73 1 1 0.68 1216.76 497.05 11025423 
2003 1.98 1 1 0.67 1092.37 417.34 12959871 
2004 2.06 1 1 0.70 1004.31 376.05 15549968 
2005 2.17 1.05 1.05 0.68 845.49 360.78 23607740 
2006 2.21 1.34 1.34 0.64 800.71 296.31 28829206 
2007 2.20 1.65 1.65 0.64 803.02 281.95 36201954 
2008 2.16 1.90 1.90 0.49 746.50 217.26 39567043 
Intel and AMD were the top two CPU makers, accounting for 99.65% of 
CPU sales. We grouped all other CPU makers into one category “other CPUs”. 
The top nine branded PC vendors - Lenovo, Founder, HP, Dell, Tongfang, 
Acer, Asus, IBM and Sony, together with user-assembled PCs or “White Box” 
– had a market share of 81.7% in 2001 and 92.5% in 2008. We grouped the 
remaining PC vendors into the “other vendors” category. Their market share 
dwindled from 20% to 7% in the period under study. China’s PC market 
became increasingly concentrated during those eight years, with the top nine 
branded PC vendors’ market share increasing from 53% to 71%.  
Figure 2 presents the evolution of market share in terms of units sold by 
major vendors. Foreign brands, such as HP and Dell, gained market share, and 
most Chinese vendors lost market share, especially after 2005. However, 
Lenovo had a different trajectory. Its market share decreased gradually until 
2004, when the trend reversed and it started to grow. A closer examination of 
Lenovo’s market share change reveals that the LBG and TBG had a different 
trajectory before 2004, but a similar trajectory after that. The timing of the 
reversal suggests that the acquisition of IBM’s PC division might be a key 
contributor. 
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Figure 2 Evolution of Market Share from 2001 to 2008  
 
To provide model-free evidence that the acquisition might have affected 
Lenovo’s brand equity, we ran a hedonic regression of price on product 
attributes, vendor and brand dummies, and time trend as follows:  
0 1 2 3 4ln * *( ) post LBG postj TBG post jtt jt t Ip x I I I I e          (1) 
Where pjt is the retail price, and xjt denotes a vector of product attributes, 
including CPU speed, the number of cores, as well as dummies for vendors, 
PC brands, CPU makers, CPU brands, form factors, and channels. t is a time 
trend ranging from 1 to 32 and η1 captures the general price trend of personal 
computer. Ipost is an indicator for the post-M&A period (2005-08), ILBG is an 
indicator for Lenovo Business Group, and ITBG is an indicator for Think 
Business Group, only Think Series after the acquisition, since Lenovo stopped 
producing all other IBM SKUs. η2 represents overall price change in the 
post-merger period, and η3 and η4 stand for respectively the additional change 
in the prices of all Lenovo brands and Think Series. The results are in Table 2. 
The time trend is negative, indicating PC prices declined at a rate of 4.08% per 
quarter. The coefficient for the post-merger period is positive, implying the 
 12 
 
decline of PC prices slowed after the acquisition. Interestingly, the coefficients 
for LBG*post-merger and TBG*post-merger are both positive, indicating that 
the decline of prices for all Lenovo brands and Think Series was slower than 
other brands, or the merged firm’s PCs became relatively more expensive. As 
aforementioned, Lenovo’s market share increased in the post-merger period. 
Rising share at relatively more expensive prices suggested that consumer’s 
preference for Lenovo might be higher in the post-acquisition period, and 
Lenovo’s brand equity might have increased due to the acquisition. 
Table 2  Hedonic Regression of Price on Product Attributes 
Coefficient Std Error 
Time trend -0.042 0.000 
Post-merger period 0.102 0.008 
LBG*post-merger 0.036 0.014 
TBG*post-merger 0.482 0.041 
CPU speed 0.459 0.011 
No. of cores 0.402 0.004 
Desktop -0.668 0.007 
Laptop -0.180 0.006 
Intel -0.142 0.014 
AMD -0.240 0.015 
Dealer -0.003 0.006 
Retail -0.026 0.006 
Lenovo -0.749 0.022 
Founder -0.749 0.019 
HP -0.170 0.020 
Dell -0.654 0.024 
Tongfang -0.853 0.020 
Acer -0.641 0.032 
Asus -0.510 0.020 
IBM -0.354 0.029 
Sony -0.260 0.020 
White box -0.945 0.017 
Others -0.795 0.016 
PC brand dummies Yes  
CPU brand dummies Yes  
N 30,976  
R2 0.638  
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MODEL FORMULATION 
To measure the impact of M&As on firm profit through different 
mechanisms, we need to find out what would happen to firm profit if an M&A 
did not affect consumer preferences, marginal costs, or firm’s pricing, which 
necessitates counterfactual policy experiments, and thus structural modelling. 
In our structural model setup, we derive a demand model from a 
consumer’s utility maximization behavior. The demand model allows us to 
capture how M&As affect the intrinsic preferences of consumers. How change 
in brand preference influences firms’ prices and profits is captured by firm’s 
pricing equation on supply side. We derive the pricing equation from a firm’s 
profit maximizing behavior, where firms set prices based on product portfolio 
and marginal costs. From the pricing equation, we can back out marginal costs 
and check how M&As affect firm’s cost, by comparing the cost trajectories of 
firms that are involved in M&As with those that are not, before and after an 
M&A. If the marginal costs of the focal firm fall faster than those of other 
firms and faster than before, we conclude that there exist cost synergies 
brought about by the M&A. 
DEMAND MODEL  
The indirect utility of consumer i derives from buying PC model j of 
brand b offered by vendor v in quarter t is:  
, , 1 2 *TS TS iijt i jt TS pre TS po p jt post l post jt i tst jp t I Iu x I II                (2) 
Where: xjt and pjt are as defined above, αi refers to consumer i’s tastes over 
product attributes, and βip represents the disutility of price. ITS is an indicator 
for the acquired brands (Think Series in our context). We estimate a different 
coefficient for consumer’s intrinsic preference for the acquired brands for the 
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pre- and post-M&A periods to see how M&As affect consumer’s preference 
for the acquired brands, on top of the vendor effect.  
The time trend t could capture income growth, the overall trend in a 
consumer’s intrinsic preference for PCs, and other time-varying factors. Ipost is 
an indicator for the post-M&A period, and Il is an indicator for the acquiring 
firm, e.g., Lenovo in our empirical context. Thus, λ1 captures the shift in the 
overall intrinsic preference for PCs in the post-M&A period, induced by 
market-wide demand shocks that affect all vendors2, and λ2 captures the 
incremental shift in the intrinsic preference for the acquiring firm in the 
post-M&A period, induced by the M&A. Since the acquired brands in the 
post-M&A period are under the ownership of the acquiring firm, λ2 also 
captures the effect of the acquiring firm on the acquired brands. For the 
acquired brand Think Series, λ2 is the net brand equity effect brought forward 
by the ownership change.  
ξit refers to unobservable product characteristics or product specific 
demand shocks, such as advertising, and εijt is the idiosyncratic consumer 
utility component. We assume that εijt follows an i.i.d. Type-I extreme value 
distribution and consumers exhibit different intrinsic preferences for product 
attributes and vendors, and have varying price sensitivities, which leads to the 
random coefficients (RC) logit probability of product choice. The random 
coefficients model is able to relax the independence of irrelevant alternatives 
(IIA) property inherent in the standard logit model, because the changes in 
choice probability induced by the variations in one’s own and others’ prices 
and product attributes depend on the distributions of αi and βip. This will help 
                                                              
2 We verified that no other M&As occurred during the data period in China’s PC market. 
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to generate flexible substitution patterns, which are crucial for quantifying the 
total impact of an M&A on a firm’s profit and allocating the impact across 
different mechanisms. To accommodate unobserved consumer heterogeneity, 
we assume that the parameters for consumer tastes and price sensitivity are 
normally distributed: 
' ' 2
' ' 2
, ~ (0, )
, ~ (0, )
i i i
ip p ip ip p
where N
where N
    
    
    
                              (3) 
We allow consumers to have the option of not purchasing any of the 
products available to allow the market to expand or contract due to marketing 
activities. The mean utility of the outside good is normalized to zero for 
identification purposes. The utility of the outside good is iot=εiot, where εiot 
follows an i.i.d. Type-I extreme value distribution. Denoting δjt the mean 
utility common across all consumers, and μijt consumer-specific utility, 
, , 1 2
' '
*TS Tjt jt TS pre TS post p jt post l post jt
ijt i jt ip jt ijt
Sx I I p t I I I
x p
      
  
 

    
  
  
  (4) 
we have the probability of consumer i choosing alternative j at time t as 
=1
exp( + )
=
1+ exp( + )
jt ijt
ijt J
jt ijtj
P
 
                                         (5) 
The market share for alternative j at time t is:  
=1
exp( + )ˆ = ( )
1+ exp( + )
jt ijt
jt ijt ijtJ
jt ijtj
S d
                                    (6) 
SUPPLY SIDE 
Each vendor in the PC market offers multiple models of PCs. We assume 
PC vendors engage in Bertrand competition and each vendor sets prices for all 
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of its products jointly to maximize the profits of its product line. Vendor v’s 
profit is: 
( ) ( )jt jt t jt t vtj vvt p mc M S P C                                (7) 
where mcjt and Sjt are, respectively, product j’s marginal cost and market share 
at time t, and Mt is the time-varying market size. Pt is the vector of retail prices, 
and Cvt is the fixed cost. The latter does not affect the firm’s pricing behavior 
because it drops out of the first-order conditions (FOCs) of profit 
maximization. The FOCs for vendor v are: 
( ) 0ktjt kt ktk v
jt
SS p mc
p
                                      (8) 
Arranging the FOCs of all of the vendors together in matrix form, we 
have: 
( ) (   )( ) 0t t t t tS P P MC                                        (9) 
where S(Pt) and MCt are, respectively, the vectors of market share and 
marginal cost across all vendors. Ωt is the vendor’s product ownership matrix 
whose ωjkth cell takes the value of 1 if the row product j and the column 
product k belong to the same vendor, and 0 otherwise. t is the matrix of the 
first derivatives of market share St with respect to price Pt whose kjth cell is 
Skt/pjt, and “ ” indicates element-wise product or dot product. Thus,  
1(   ) ( )t t t t tP MC S P
                                         (10) 
 The marginal costs can be backed out as: 
1(   ) ( )t t t t tMC P S P
                                         (11) 
After estimating the demand parameters, we can compute Skt/pjt, i.e., the 
t matrix, and back out the marginal costs. Once we have obtained the 
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marginal costs, we can project them onto cost shifters and estimate the 
coefficients. We then can assume that the estimated demand and marginal cost 
parameters are given, and run various policy experiments.  
ESTIMATION 
DEMAND AND COST PARAMETER ESTIMATION 
We take a two-step approach (Nevo 2001) to estimate the demand model. 
We first estimate the demand parameters (Equation 5) by the Generalized 
Method of Moments, and then use the demand parameter estimates to back out 
firms’ marginal costs (Equation 11). We next project marginal costs on 
various cost shifters (Sudhir 2001, Chu 2013) in the following manner: 
, , 4 5 6 *ln( ) x TS pre TS TS posj t TS post l post jt jt tI I t Im I Ic x                (12) 
Since unobserved product attributes, such as advertising, might be 
correlated with price and result in a potential endogeneity problem, we use 
instrumental variables. As suggested by Rossi (2014), the instruments we use 
are cost shifters, including producer price index (PPI) for CPU and RAM 
lagged by two quarters, purchasing managers index (PMI)3, cost of goods sold, 
and observed product characteristics (only product j’s observed attributes, not 
BLP-type instruments). Since PPI and PMI do not vary with choice 
alternatives, we interact them with vendor dummies and the CPU speed 
variable to facilitate estimation. The first-stage R-squared is 0.50, and 
Cragg-Donald F statistic is 18.83, indicating strong instruments (Rossi 2014). 
Following Chu, Chintagunta and Vilcassim (2007), we define the 
potential market size as the sum of government and business employees in 
                                                              
3 PMI is an indicator of the economic health of the manufacturing sector. It is based on five major indicators: 
new orders, inventory levels, production, supplier deliveries and the employment environment. A PMI of more 
than 50 represents expansion of the manufacturing sector, compared to the previous month. A reading under 50 
represents a contraction, while a reading at 50 indicates no change. China’s PMI is produced by the State 
Statistics Bureau of China, and the Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC). 
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each quarter. The potential market size doubled from 101 million in 1Q2001 
to 215 million in 4Q2008. We test the sensitivities of the estimates to other 
definitions of potential market size. 
POLICY EXPERIMENTS 
Policy experiments are counterfactual or thought experiments that help to 
answer “what… if…” questions, and address the impact of policy changes. In 
each policy experiment, we take demand parameter estimates, marginal costs, 
and marginal cost parameter estimates as given, and compute equilibrium 
prices and shares under the new scenario by simultaneously solving the system 
of demand and pricing equations (Equations 6 and 10). We then compare firm 
profit under the counterfactual scenario with actual profits and examine gains 
or losses. Next, we explain how each of the three mechanisms is captured in 
the system of equations. 
Brand equity effect. From the demand model specification, we can see 
that: (i) before the Lenovo acquisition, the intrinsic preference for other 
vendors was βiv + γt4; (ii) after the acquisition, the intrinsic preference for 
other vendors is βiv + γt + λ1; (iii) before the acquisition, the intrinsic 
preference for Lenovo was βil + γt; and (iv) after the acquisition, the intrinsic 
preference for Lenovo is βil + γt + λ1 + λ2. The difference in intrinsic 
preference between Lenovo and other vendors before the acquisition is (βil - 
βiv), and the difference in intrinsic preference after the acquisition is (βil + γt + 
λ1 + λ2) – (βiv + γt + λ1) = (βil – βiv) + λ2. Using the Difference in Difference 
method to compare the differences in intrinsic preferences before and after the 
acquisition, we obtain the change in Lenovo’s brand equity as (βil – βiv) + λ2 – 
                                                              
4 βiv represents consumer i’s preference over PC vendor v. 
 19 
 
(βil – βiv) = λ2. Thus, our key parameter of interest is 2, the incremental change 
in Lenovo’s brand equity induced by the acquisition of the PC division. 
Cost synergies effect. From the marginal cost equation, we can see that: (i) 
before the Lenovo acquisition, the marginal cost for other vendors was θv + θ4t; 
(ii) after the acquisition, the marginal cost for other vendors is θv + θ4t + θ5; 
(iii) before the acquisition, Lenovo’s marginal cost was θl + θ4t; and (iv) after 
the acquisition, Lenovo’s marginal cost is θl + θ4t + θ5 + θ6. The difference in 
marginal costs between Lenovo and other vendors before the acquisition was 
(θl - θv), and the difference after the acquisition is (θl + θ4t + θ5 + θ6) – (θv + 
θ4t + θ5) = (θl – θv) + θ6. Using the Difference in Difference method, we obtain 
the incremental change in Lenovo’s marginal cost as (θl – θv) + θ6 – (θl – θv) = 
θ6. Thus, our key parameter of interest is θ6, the incremental change in 
Lenovo’s costs brought by the acquisition of IBM’s PC division. 
Product portfolio effect. This is captured by the change in the product 
ownership matrix Ω. Before the acquisition, Lenovo and IBM were two 
independent entities, each maximizing its own profit by setting prices for its 
own product line. After the acquisition, Lenovo and IBM’s PC division 
became a single entity, maximizing joint profit by setting prices for Lenovo’s 
product line and the Think Series jointly. The ownership matrix before and 
after the acquisition is, respectively, 
,
1    0
0         1
Lenovobefore
Lenovo IBM
IBM
     
 and ,
1   1
1         1
Lenovoafter
Lenovo IBM
IBM
     
 
Where 1Lenovo and 1IBM are matrices of 1’s. 
We intend to quantify the impact of the acquisition of IBM’s PC division 
on Lenovo’s profits, and decompose the impact into gains or losses 
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attributable to brand equity, cost synergies, and changes in the product 
portfolio. We also want to understand how these three mechanisms interact 
with each other. To achieve this goal, we have to compute the would-be 
profits as if there were no change in brand equity, marginal cost, or the 
product portfolio after the acquisition. We can take three actions towards this 
end: (A) set λ2 in the demand model to zero, (B) set θ6 in the marginal cost 
function to zero, and (C) change Lenovo’s post-acquisition product ownership 
matrix to the pre-acquisition product ownership matrix. To quantify the total 
impact of the acquisition and the impact of each mechanism, we need to take 
the three actions either jointly or individually. We summarize the procedures 
of the policy experiments in Table 3 and explain below how each objective 
can be achieved.  
Table 3  Policy Experiments 
Experiment# Actions Main effect Two-way interactions Three-way 
interaction 
Brand 
equity 
(BE) 
Cost 
synergies 
(CS) 
Product 
portfolio 
(PP) 
BE*CS BE*PP CS*PP BE*CS*PP 
0 Actual √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
1 A B C x x x x x x x 
2  B C √ x x x x x x 
3 A  C x √ x x x x x 
4 A B  x x √ x x x x 
5   C √ √ x √ x x x 
6  B  √ x √ x √ x x 
7 A   x √ √ x x √ x 
 
“√” indicates the effect exists, and “x” indicates the effect does not exist 
Actions taken: 
A. Set λ2 = 0 
B. Set θ6 = 0 
C. No change in product ownership (Lenovo has the same ownership matrix as before 
acquisition) 
The total effect and the individual effect of each mechanism can be computed as follows: 
(i) Total effect: (0) – (1) = BE + CS + PP + BE*CS + BE*PP + CS*PP + BE*CS*PP 
(ii) BE main effect: (2) – (1) 
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(iii) CS main effect: (3) – (1) 
(iv) PP main effect: (4) – (1) 
(v) BE*CS interaction effect: (5) – [(2) + (3)] 
(vi) BE*PP interaction effect: (6) – [(2) + (4)] 
(vii) CS*PP interaction effect: (7) – [(3) + (4)] 
(viii) BE*CS*PP interaction effect: total effect – sum of ((ii) ~ (vii)) 
(i) Combined effect of three mechanisms 
To quantify the total effect of the acquisition on firm profits, we first 
compute firm profits under the scenario that the acquisition did not affect 
brand equity, marginal costs or product ownership. Thus, we need to take 
actions A, B and C (Scenario 1 in Table 3). We compute equilibrium prices, 
shares and firm profits under this scenario, and compare counterfactual profits 
with actual profits. If actual profits are higher than counterfactual profits, then 
the acquisition provided Lenovo with additional profit. Otherwise, Lenovo 
incurred a loss from the acquisition. 
(ii) Main effect of brand equity 
To quantify the main effect of brand equity on firm profit, the 
counterfactual scenario is that the acquisition only affected consumer 
preference for Lenovo. We take actions B and C jointly to remove the effects 
of cost synergies and the product portfolio (Scenario 2 in Table 3), and 
compare the differences in profit between this scenario and Scenario 1.  
(iii) Main effect of cost synergies 
To quantify the main effect of cost synergies on firm profit, the 
counterfactual scenario is that the acquisition only affected Lenovo’s marginal 
costs. We take actions A and C jointly to remove the effects of brand equity 
and the product portfolio (Scenario 3 in Table 3), and compare the difference 
in profit between this scenario and Scenario 1. 
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(iv) Main effect of changes in the product portfolio 
To quantify the main effect of changes in the product portfolio on firm 
profit, the counterfactual scenario is that the acquisition only allowed Lenovo 
to include IBM’s PC brands in its product portfolio while maximizing its 
profit. We take actions A and B jointly to remove the effects of brand equity 
and cost synergies (Scenario 4 in Table 3), and compare the difference in 
profit between this scenario and Scenario 1. 
(v) Interaction effect between brand equity and cost synergies  
To quantify the effect of the interaction5 between brand equity and cost 
synergies on firm profit, we take Action C alone (Scenario 5 in Table 3), and 
compare the differences in profit between this scenario and the sum of profits 
in Scenarios 2 and 3. This scenario has the main effect of brand equity, the 
main effect of cost synergies, and the interaction effect between brand equity 
and cost synergies, while Scenario 2 only has the main effect of brand equity, 
and Scenario 3 only has the main effect of cost synergies. 
(vi) Interaction effect between brand equity and product portfolio 
To quantify the interaction effect between brand equity and changes in 
product portfolio on firm profit, we take Action B alone (Scenario 6 in Table 
3), and compare the difference in profits between this scenario and the sum of 
profits in Scenarios 2 and 4. This scenario has the main effect of brand equity, 
the main effect of product portfolio, and the interaction effect between brand 
equity and product portfolio, while Scenario 2 only has the main effect of 
brand equity, and Scenario 4 only has the main effect of product portfolio. 
                                                              
5 “Interaction effect” has a broad meaning here. It includes all kinds of synergies and spillovers between two 
or three mechanisms. It can also be interpreted as the residual between the total effect and the sum of main 
effects.  
 23 
 
(vii) Interaction effect between cost synergies and product portfolio 
changes 
To quantify the interaction effect between cost synergies and changes in 
the product portfolio on firm profit, we take Action A alone (Scenario 7 in 
Table 3), and compare the difference in profit between this scenario and the 
sum of profits in Scenarios 3 and 4. This scenario has the main effect of cost 
synergies, the main effect of product portfolio, and the interaction effect 
between cost synergies and product portfolio. Scenario 3 only has the main 
effect of cost synergies, and Scenario 4 only has the main effect of product 
portfolio. 
(viii) Interaction effect between brand equity, cost synergies and 
changes in product portfolios 
We take the residual between the total profit effect and the sum of profits 
in (ii) through (vii) as the effect of three-way interactions between the three 
mechanisms. 
It is important to note that when we compare profits across different 
scenarios, we do not account for potential changes in fixed costs. Fixed costs 
might differ across scenarios. M&As might also lead to synergies in fixed 
costs due to combination of production or sales forces. They may increase 
fixed costs if the merged firm increases spending, say, on advertising. 
However, firms have information on these fixed costs and can easily factor 
them into the profit calculation. 
RESULTS 
In this section, we first report the demand parameter estimates, the 
derived substitution patterns, implied marginal costs, and firm margins. We 
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then check the robustness of the model. We conclude by analyzing the policy 
experiment results. 
Demand Estimates 
Table 4  Demand Parameter Estimates 
Random Coefficient Logit 
 OLS 2SLS Means 
Standard 
Deviations 
Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE SD SE 
Price (in $1000) -0.878 0.025 -3.401 0.250 -5.697 0.176 1.140 0.004
CPU Speed -0.914 0.073 0.335 0.149 0.500 0.251 0.726 0.494
No of cores -0.157 0.028 0.811 0.101 1.199 0.044 1.174 0.003
Time trend 0.006 0.003 -0.106 0.012 -0.172 0.006 
Overall post-M&A effect (λ1) -0.365 0.054 0.015 0.072 0.709 0.037 
Brand equity effect (λ2) 0.319 0.090 0.460 0.105 0.152 0.079 
Desktop 0.854 0.046 -0.706 0.163 -1.564 0.188 1.896 0.517
Laptop 0.578 0.039 0.121 0.064 -0.261 0.114 6.736 0.683
Dealer 1.626 0.037 1.683 0.043 1.667 0.019 
Retail 1.392 0.039 1.341 0.045 1.295 0.019 
Lenovo -13.159 0.145 -9.215 0.423 -8.312 1.009 4.129 0.311
Founder -14.640 0.128 -10.723 0.413 -19.202 1.055 6.440 1.324
HP -13.759 0.143 -7.419 0.646 -6.066 1.304 2.658 0.902
Dell -13.971 0.161 -9.577 0.471 -13.777 0.182 4.367 0.220
Tongfang -14.151 0.132 -10.557 0.386 -18.815 2.422 2.840 0.350
Acer -14.160 0.207 -9.873 0.485 -10.330 1.480 13.762 0.116
Asus -14.740 0.134 -9.928 0.499 -13.713 0.856 0.179 0.023
IBM -14.276 0.177 -7.444 0.703 -7.709 0.020 0.901 0.006
Sony -13.848 0.137 -8.196 0.579 -31.766 0.248 0.317 0.061
Other vendors -14.945 0.108 -10.981 0.410 -8.942 0.293 0.638 0.088
White Box -12.703 0.115 -9.144 0.375 -14.278 0.281 2.025 0.649
Intel 1.012 0.088 0.338 0.122 0.337 0.035 3.420 0.010
AMD 0.756 0.095 -0.068 0.136 -0.253 0.034 0.730 0.490
Think Series (pre-M&A) 0.719 0.160 -0.768 0.236 -1.165 0.157  
Think Series (post-M&A) 0.075 0.099 1.136 0.155 1.451 0.040  
*Coefficient estimates for brands are not reported for space reason. 
 
Table 4 presents the demand estimation results from the OLS, 2SLS, and 
RC Logit models. For space reasons, we omitted the estimates for the brand 
dummies. In the OLS estimates, the implied average own price elasticity is 
-0.85, which is very small and likely to suggest the existence of price 
endogeneity. In the 2SLS estimates, the price coefficient becomes more 
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negative. The implied mean price elasticity is -3.29, a more reasonable 
estimate, indicating that our instruments are effective in accounting for price 
endogeneity. The coefficients for CPU speed and the number of cores also 
turn into positive, as would be expected. 
The RC logit model accounts for unobserved consumer heterogeneity and 
price endogeneity, which makes the price coefficient more negative. The 
implied mean price elasticity is -5.19, and the implied profit margin is 28.78% 
(Table 7). According to CSI Market (CSI Market 2014), the average gross 
margin in the computer hardware industry in 2005Q1 was 28.57%. Our 
estimate is very close to the industry average, which lends some face validity 
to our results. Accounting for unobserved consumer heterogeneity also leads 
to more diffuse preferences over vendors. There is a huge amount of 
unobserved consumer heterogeneity in intrinsic preferences for brands and 
other product attributes and in price sensitivity. On average, consumers treat 
the ultraportable and laptop very similarly, and prefer laptops to desktops. 
Consistent with our expectations, consumers prefer Intel processors to AMD 
processors, and prefer PCs with a higher CPU speed, and with more cores. The 
overall time trend is negative. Since the market size doubled during the data 
period while PC sales quadrupled, the negative trend may suggest a declining 
preference for PCs and the commoditization of PCs. This may pose a 
challenge for branded PC vendors.  
Now, we discuss the effect of Lenovo’s acquisition. The average 
post-acquisition coefficient is 0.71 with a standard error (SE) of 0.04, 
suggesting that the overall preference of consumers for PCs in the 
post-acquisition period was higher. The more competitive post-acquisition 
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environment may have forced PC makers to improve their quality and spend 
more on branding. The preference-lifting effect of the acquisition on Lenovo 
was more pronounced. The coefficient of the interaction term between Lenovo 
and the post-acquisition indicator Il*Ipost, our key parameter of interest, is 0.15 
(SE =.08), which is significant at the 5% level, and an improvement of about 2% 
over the mean brand preference for Lenovo. This suggests that on average, the 
acquisition helped Lenovo differentiate itself from other vendors, and 
increased its brand equity. 
When IBM decided to sell its Think Series to Lenovo, a much lesser 
known Chinese PC maker, there was concern that the acquisition might dilute 
the Think Series’ brand equity (Zellen 2005). However, we did not find that 
the Think Series brand in China’s PC market was diluted by the acquisition. 
We compare intrinsic preferences for the Think Series before and after the 
acquisition. Before the acquisition, the intrinsic preference for Think Series 
was the summation of coefficients for IBM (-7.709), Think Series (pre, 
-1.165), and the time trend (-0.172). This was -11.626 (= 
-7.709-1.165-0.172*16) immediately before the acquisition (4Q2004, t = 16). 
After the acquisition, the intrinsic preference for Think Series was the 
summation of coefficients for Lenovo (-8.312), Think Series (post, 1.451), 
time trend (-0.172), the overall post-acquisition effect (0.709), and the 
incremental acquisition effect for Lenovo (0.152). In 1Q2005 (t = 17), the 
quarter immediately after the acquisition, the coefficient was -8.924. By the 
end of our data period (t = 32), the coefficient was -11.504. Therefore, the 
brand equity of the Think Series was not diluted by the acquisition. 
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Table 5 presents the derived substitution pattern. The diagonal elements 
are own-price elasticities, and the off-diagonal elements are cross-price 
elasticities. Each column depicts how the row brands’ market shares would 
change when the column brand’s price increased by 1%. For example, from 
the first column, we know that when Lenovo increased its price by 1%, its 
market share would decrease by 4.30%, Founder’s share would increase by 
0.006%, and HP’s share would go up by 0.013%. 
Table 5  Derived Substitution Patterns 
 Lenovo Founder HP Dell Tongfang Acer Asus IBM Sony Others 
White 
Box 
Lenovo -4.296 0.027 0.041 0.020 0.031 0.040 0.062 0.041 0.027 0.052 0.020 
Founder 0.006 -3.550 0.007 0.016 0.005 0.006 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.009 0.003 
HP 0.013 0.012 -5.529 0.023 0.015 0.012 0.025 0.007 0.048 0.016 0.005 
Dell 0.006 0.025 0.017 -5.249 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.003 0.008 0.011 0.001 
Tongfang 0.003 0.002 0.008 0.004 -3.454 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.010 0.005 0.002 
Acer 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 -4.358 0.017 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.002 
Asus 0.006 0.001 0.007 0.003 0.002 0.021 -5.960 0.002 0.008 0.004 0.001 
IBM 0.004 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.005 -7.879 0.007 0.005 0.007 
Sony 0.002 0.001 0.012 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.004 -9.386 0.003 0.007 
Others 0.018 0.013 0.019 0.014 0.013 0.015 0.015 0.025 0.010 -4.211 0.010 
White Box 0.015 0.010 0.011 0.004 0.014 0.026 0.012 0.033 0.064 0.019 -3.193 
 
The substitution is asymmetric. When Lenovo changed its price, it 
affected other branded vendors the most, followed by White Box and HP. 
When HP changed its price, it affected Lenovo the most, followed by other 
branded vendors and Dell. When Dell changed its price, it affected HP the 
most, followed by Lenovo and Founder. When IBM changed its price, it 
affected Lenovo the most with a cross elasticity of 0.041. This implies that 
these two vendors were close substitutes and the acquisition might soften 
competition and benefit Lenovo. The substitution pattern shows that Lenovo 
competed not only with Chinese brands, but also with foreign brands.   
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We calculate the substitution pattern separately for the pre- and 
post-acquisition periods, and compute each vendor’s clout and vulnerability as 
in Chintagunta (1992)6. Figure 3 contrasts the clout-vulnerability map before 
and after the acquisition. The biggest change is the enlarged distance between 
Lenovo and its competitors. Before the acquisition, Lenovo was close to 
White Box and other small PC vendors; however, after the acquisition, 
Lenovo stood out from its main competitors. This suggests that the acquisition 
of IBM’s PC division helped differentiate Lenovo from its competitors and 
shielded Lenovo from competition. Foreign vendors such as HP and Dell also 
had to contend with less competition after the acquisition as they operated in 
the Chinese PC market.  
Figure 3 Clout and Vulnerability before and after the Acquisition  
 
A closer examination of the price elasticities suggests that consumers 
became less price sensitive. The average price elasticity went down from -5.92 
to -5.25. However, cross elasticities increased, indicating the market became 
                                                             
6 Take Lenovo as example, the clout of Lenovo measures the influence of Lenovo’s price change on other 
brands’ demand. Mathematically, it is the sum of squared cross elasticities of HP to other brands. 
Vulnerability of Lenovo measures the influence of other brands’ price changes on Lenovo’s demand. 
Mathematically, it is the sum of squared cross elasticities of other brands to Lenovo. 
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more competitive and firms were more likely to lose customers to competitors 
if they increased prices. Furthermore, the increase in cross elasticities was not 
symmetric for PC vendors. After the acquisition, Tongfang, Founder, and 
other small brands became less competitive, while Lenovo, on the hand, 
became relatively more competitive: before the acquisition, Lenovo could 
attract buyers from six other vendors when it changed price, but, after the 
acquisition, it attracted buyers from eight vendors. This means that the 
acquisition enhanced Lenovo’s market competitiveness. Further, competitive 
power became concentrated in fewer firms after the acquisition. 
Implied Marginal Costs and Vendor Margins 
Table 6  Marginal Cost Regression Results and Cost Synergies 
 Coefficient Std errors 
CPU Speed 0.015 0.0004 
No of cores 0.271 0.003 
Time trend -0.0317 0.0004 
Overall post-acquisition coefficient 0.009 0.014 
Lenovo’s additional post-acquisition effect -0.052 0.023 
Desktop -0.935 0.012 
Laptop -0.216 0.010 
Dealer -0.014 0.010 
Retail -0.039 0.010 
Lenovo 1.164 0.043 
Founder 2.056 0.047 
HP 1.882 0.046 
Dell 2.622 0.046 
Tongfang 1.931 0.052 
Acer 1.708 0.046 
Asus 2.124 0.063 
IBM 2.182 0.046 
Sony 3.417 0.075 
Other vendors 2.493 0.046 
White Box 1.858 0.042 
Intel 0.116 0.023 
AMD -0.021 0.025 
*Cost synergies =1- post-M&A marginal cost/pre-M&A marginal cost 
                   =1-exp(-0.052)/exp(0) = 0.051 
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Table 6 reports the coefficients of the marginal costs. As expected, the 
marginal costs of PCs declined over time, at a pace of 3.1% per quarter. The 
cost of a PC is directly proportional to the speed of its CPUs and the number 
of cores it has. Desktops cost less than laptops, which are in turn cheaper than 
ultraportables. PCs with Intel CPUs cost more than those with AMD CPUs. 
Other vendors’ marginal costs in the post- acquisition period were not 
significantly different from before – the coefficient on the post-acquisition 
period was positive, but not statistically significant. However, the acquisition 
helped to reduce Lenovo’s marginal costs significantly. The coefficient was 
-0.052 (SE = 0.023), implying a cost reduction of 5.07% and confirming the 
existence of cost synergies for Lenovo. 
Table 7 presents the implied vendor margins. Although PC prices 
decreased over time (Table 1), vendor margins increased in the same period. 
This was because marginal costs declined at a faster pace than PC prices, 
especially in the post-acquisition period. Average vendor margins increased 
from 19.69% in 2001 to 32.90% in 2008, although there was a high level of 
variation in the level of vendor margins. 
Table 7  Implied Firm Margin 
 Lenovo Founder HP Dell Tongfang Acer Asus IBM Sony* White Box Mean 
2001 22.83% 21.95% 17.82% 16.65% 28.83% 18.36% 11.04% 13.52% - 20.89% 19.69%
2002 26.09% 27.42% 18.22% 17.02% 41.05% 26.40% 16.68% 16.83% 9.51% 29.08% 24.50%
2003 26.76% 27.58% 19.27% 19.76% 26.79% 28.70% 14.06% 19.11% 9.18% 34.64% 23.76%
2004 27.86% 29.12% 22.83% 23.57% 32.65% 25.14% 16.72% 16.71% 10.04% 37.21% 25.50%
2005 29.71% 35.02% 21.16% 21.72% 30.59% 28.07% 16.36% 23.78% 15.29% 55.58% 28.23%
2006 31.02% 33.75% 22.20% 23.43% 34.99% 27.91% 19.45% 8.13% 12.22% 48.25% 28.80%
2007 32.28% 40.46% 26.02% 29.08% 35.35% 29.17% 21.16% 10.59% 11.75% 58.46% 32.32%
2008 29.09% 35.14% 25.70% 40.05% 38.75% 26.31% 25.77% 11.62% 15.32% 55.57% 32.90%
Mean 29.35% 34.54% 23.21% 27.48% 34.91% 27.08% 20.40% 16.60% 12.77% 44.88% 28.78%
* Sony entered into China market in 2002. 
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Policy Experiments: the Profit Impact of the Acquisition  
(1) Impact on total profit  
Table 8 summarizes the total profit for Lenovo as well as the profits for 
LBG and TBG under different policy experiments. Our first experiment is to 
evaluate the total profit impact of the acquisition, where we assume that there 
were no change in brand preference for Lenovo, no cost synergies, and 
Lenovo set prices independently for LBG and TBG. Lenovo’s total profit 
under this experiment will be $2.39 billion less or 21.08% lower than its actual 
(also estimated) profit where all three gains exist. Compared with the $1.75 
billion acquisition cost, the acquisition paid for itself just from the Chinese PC 
market in four years. Further, without the acquisition, LBG and TBG’s profits 
would be respectively $1.36 billion and $0.71 billion lower than their actual 
profits. The dual change implies that the mutual enhancement between Think 
Series and LBG was an important revenue source for Lenovo7. 
Table 8  Profit (in billion US$) of LBG and TBG under Different Scenarios 
 Actual Scenario1 Scenario 2 Scenario3 Scenario 4 Scenario5 Scenario6 Scenario7 
 
 No Gain 
Brand 
equity 
Cost 
synergies 
Product 
portfolios 
Brand equity+
cost synergies
Brand equity+ 
Product 
portfolios 
Cost synergies+
product portfolios
LBG 6.867 5.511 6.307 5.998 5.515 6.859 6.313 6.004 
TBG 1.030 0.722 0.828 0.903 0.721 1.034 0.825 0.901 
Total 7.898 6.233 7.135 6.901 6.236 7.893 7.139 6.905 
Changes 
over 
scenario 1 
  0.902 0.668 0.003 1.660 0.906 0.672 
 
(2) Brand equity gains, cost synergies and product portfolio gains: Main 
effects 
To disentangle the main effects of the gains in brand equity, cost 
synergies, and product portfolio gains, and assess their relative contributions, 
                                                              
7 We acknowledge that the stock market reacted negatively immediately after the announcement of Lenovo’s 
buyout. However, the market response might be myopic. Lenovo’s stock price went back to the 
pre-announcement level in one quarter and outperformed the market index (Appendix I).   
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we run three other policy experiments (Scenarios 2-4) by closing off two of 
the three mechanisms alternately (See Table 3 for details). Comparing 
Experiment 2 with Experiment 1, we find that brand equity alone would lift 
Lenovo’s profit from $6.23 billion to $7.13 billion, a net gain of $0.90 billion, 
which was 11.42% of Lenovo’s actual profit. 
Similarly, comparing Experiment 3 with Experiment 1, we find that cost 
synergies helped to lift Lenovo’s profit from $6.23 billion to $6.90 billion, a 
net gain of $0.67 billion, which was about 8.45% of Lenovo’s actual profit. 
Comparing Experiment 4 with Experiment 1, we find that changes in the 
product portfolio only increased profits by $2.70 million, a negligible amount. 
Clearly, in this acquisition, the gains in brand equity were the biggest 
contributor to the increase in Lenovo’s profit, followed by cost synergies, with 
the changes in the product portfolio playing a minimal role. The gains in brand 
equity expanded the market and cost synergies directly increased profit 
margins. However, changes in product portfolios or product line pricing are 
more likely to result in cannibalizing from one’s own business. This is 
especially true when the acquiring firm’s products and the acquired products 
are close substitutes, as was the case with Lenovo and IBM. This might 
explain the stronger impact of brand equity and cost synergies on profit, 
compared to changes in the product portfolio. Further, we find the gains in 
brand equity were more effective than cost synergies in increasing Lenovo’s 
profit. A 2% (0.15/βLenovo) improvement in brand equity turned into an 11.42% 
profit increase, while 5.1% worth of cost synergies only increased profits by 
8.45%. This indicates the importance of consumers and their preferences in the 
M&A process.  
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(3) Interaction effects 
The total of the main effects of the gains in brand equity, cost synergies, 
and changes in product portfolio (the sum of the profit increase from 
Experiments 2, 3, and 4) is $1.57 billion, which is less than the $1.67 billion 
(= 7.90 – 5.51 – 0.72) increase in total profit. This means there are positive 
interactions among the three mechanisms. To surface the interaction effects, 
we do the following: we keep two of the three mechanisms and close off the 
third one to have two main effects and one interaction effect. By subtracting 
the two main effects from the previous policy experiments, we are able to 
obtain the interaction effect. 
Experiment 5 gives us the counterfactual profit of $7.89 billion when we 
keep the main effects of the gains in brand equity and cost synergies and their 
interaction effect, a net profit gain of $1.66 billion over Experiment 1. 
Subtracting the main effect of the gains in brand equity ($0.90 billion) and 
cost synergies ($0.67 billion), we obtain the (brand equity*cost synergies) 
interaction effect of $0.09 billion, a positive albeit small effect.  
Similarly, Experiment 6 keeps the main effects of the gains in brand 
equity and changes in the product portfolio and their interaction effect, 
producing a net increase in profit of $0.91 billion compared to Experiment 1. 
Subtracting the main effects of the gains in brand equity of $0.90 billion and 
the changes in the product portfolio of $2.70 million yields an interaction 
effect of $1.09 million. Experiment 7 keeps the main effects of cost synergies 
and the changes in the product portfolio and their interaction effect, generating 
a net profit gain of $0.67 billion. Subtracting the main effects of cost synergies 
and changes in the product portfolio leaves an interaction effect of $1.30 
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million. Though small in magnitude, all of the three two-way interaction 
effects are positive, implying the three mechanisms reinforce each other in 
enhancing the acquisition effect on firm profit. 
We also test for a three-way interaction among the three mechanisms by 
taking the residual between the total effect and the sum of the three main 
effects and the three two-way interaction effects, and find it is close to zero. 
The profit gains from each experiment are plotted in Figure 4 as a visual check 
of the results. 
Figure 4  Lenovo’s Profit Change Relative to its Actual Profit 
under Different Scenarios 
We illustrate how the three mechanisms influence LBG and TBG 
differently. Table 9 summarizes prices and demand for LBG and TBG in 
different scenarios. Comparing Experiment 1 with the actual situation, we find 
that the actual prices for LBG and TBG were respectively 2.72% and 1.09% 
lower than the counterfactual prices, and actual demand was respectively 
21.43% and 28.13% higher than the counterfactual demand. Though in 
principle M&As are likely to lead to higher prices, Lenovo did the opposite, 
lowering prices to stimulate demand. This would make sense if consumers 
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were price-sensitive in the market and the acquisition led to significant cost 
reductions, as was indeed the case as reported in Table 6 and as we further 
explain below.  
Table 9 Price (in $) and Demand (in million units) Change of LBG and TBG 
  Actual Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6 Scenario 7 
   No Gain 
Brand 
equity 
Cost 
synergies
Brand equity+
cost synergies
Brand equity+ 
Product portfolios
Cost synergies+ 
product portfolios 
Cost synergies+ 
Product portfolios
Price 
LBG 711.4 731.3 732.1 705.3 733.0 707.2 736.2 709.1
TBG 1306.9 1321.3 1321.8 1292.4 1331.0 1293.1 1331.9 1303.9
Demand 
LBG 30.6 25.2 28.7 27.2 25.0 30.9 28.5 26.9
TBG 4.1 3.2 3.6 3.8 3.0 4.4 3.4 3.6
 
A comparison of Experiment 2 with Experiment 1 reveals that the gains in 
brand equity did not substantially increase prices. However, they boosted 
demand for LBG and TBG by 13.89% and 12.5%, respectively. A comparison 
of Experiment 3 with Experiment 1 indicates that cost synergies led to 
reductions of 3.56% and 2.19% in the prices of LBG and TBG, and increases 
of 7.94% and 18.8% in their demand. A comparison of Experiment 4 with 
Experiment 1 suggests that changes in the product portfolio did not affect 
price and sales much, explaining its negligible effect on profit. 
Comparing Experiment 5 with Experiment 1, we find that gains in brand 
equity and cost synergies together could reduce prices by 3.30% for LBG and 
2.14% for TBG, resulting in an increase in demand of 22.62% and 37.50% 
respectively. Comparing Experiment 6 with Experiment 1, we find that the 
gains in brand equity and changes in the product portfolio together did not 
affect prices much, but could increase demand by 13.10% and 6.25% for LBG 
and TBG. Comparing Experiment 7 with Experiment 1, we find that cost 
synergies and changes in the product portfolio led to price reductions of 3.06% 
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and 1.32% and increases in demand of 6.75% and 12.50% respectively for 
LBG and TBG.   
Robustness Checks 
We conduct a series of robustness checks on the model’s assumptions, 
choices of its functional form, potential market size, and instruments, similar 
to Chu et al (2007), Chu and Chintagunta (2009), and Chu (2013). Our results 
are robust to these assumptions. In addition, we also did the following: 
Effect of economic growth. During the period under study, China’s 
economy grew rapidly, at the same time as PC sales were also increasing 
substantially. To examine the impact of economic growth on PC sales, we 
incorporated total GDP or per capita GDP into the model, in addition to the 
time trend and merger indicator. However, total GDP and quarter trend were 
highly correlated with a coefficient of 0.95, and per capita GPD and quarter 
trend had a correlation coefficient of 0.45. Since such high correlations would 
result in severe multicollinearity, we dropped the economic variables, and 
concluded the impact of economic growth was partially captured by the time 
trend in our model. 
Source of brand equity gain. We make the following two points in this 
robustness check: the estimate of brand equity gain for Lenovo is not 
influenced by advertising, channel change or product line change; brand 
equity gain primarily comes from co-branding with Think Series.  
To do so, we firstly assess consumer’s brand preference change for 
Lenovo in different post-acquisition years compared with pre-acquisition 
periods. We divide the post-acquisition data into four periods, 
07/2005-12/2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008, and estimated the following model. 
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We use only part of the whole 2005 as post-acquisition periods because the 
acquisition was finished in May, 2005, and sales for Think Series appeared 
under Lenovo from the third quarter of 2005 in our data. 
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3 2006 4 2007 5 2008
*
* * *
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  
 
       (13) 
λ2 – λ5 can be interpreted as brand equity gain for Lenovo compared with 
pre-acquisition periods in year 2005-2008 respectively. The estimates for these 
four parameters are: λ2 = 0.48 (SE = 0.15), λ3 = 0.47 (SE =0.13), λ4 = 0.49 (SE 
=0.13), and λ5 = 0.40 (SE =0.13). We can see that λ2, λ3, λ4 are not statistically 
different. This means, compared with pre-acquisition periods, consumer did 
like Lenovo more, but her preference for Lenovo was the same within the four 
years after the acquisition. Put it another way, the brand equity gains for 
Lenovo happened immediately after the acquisition - July-December, 2005, 
and it was one time-change. 
Figure 5: Baidu Index for Dell, HP and Lenovo 
 
Advertising. According to David Roman, Lenovo’s Chief Marketing 
Officer8, “The company spends roughly in line with the industry average of 
1.5 percent of sales”. According to Lenovo’s annual financial report, Lenovo 
                                                              
8 http://www.strategy-business.com/article/00274?gko=abf3e 
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spent 1.9%, 2.1%, 1.7%, 1.6% of its sales in advertising respectively in fiscal 
year 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004. Lenovo stopped reporting its advertising 
expense after March, 2005. While according to Baidu Index9 in Figure 5, the 
search volume for Lenovo followed a similar time trend with other PC vendors. 
The correlation between Lenovo and Dell, and Lenovo and HP are 0.85 and 
0.88 respectively. So the potential impact of advertising spending on the 
estimate of brand equity change is controlled by time trend variable and the 
difference in difference approach.  
Channel change. The change of Lenovo’s distribution channel was 
consistent with other PC vendors, as shown in Figure 6. More sales flew into 
retailers over time for most of PC vendors. So the difference in difference 
approach captures the impact of channel change. Yang Yuanqing, the CEO of 
Lenovo, announced the acquisition at a press conference10 and said Lenovo’s 
distribution channel will not be influenced by this acquisition. Thus, our 
estimate of brand equity effect is not affected by channel change. 
Figure 6: Proportion of Sales through Different Channels 
 
                                                              
9 Similar to google trend 
10 http://tech.sina.com.cn/it/2004-12-08/1223472551.shtml 
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Changes of product lines. Firms involved in M&As may use additional 
instruments other than prices to exploit changes in consumers’ preferences 
(Fan 2013). Since M&As often involve product line consolidations, we 
particularly checked whether Lenovo changed its product lines around the 
time of acquisition (2004Q4). During the study period, six of Lenovo’s 
product lines exited: three happened in 2001, and another three in the second 
quarter of 2003, long before the acquisition; four product lines were 
introduced: 3 occurred in 2008, long after the acquisition, and only one 
happened in 2006Q2, still one year and half after the acquisition. Thus, it 
appeared that Lenovo did not consolidate its product lines much around the 
acquisition. 
At last, Mr. ChuanZhi Liu, its founder and CEO during the acquisition, 
said the following during one interview (Zhou Xiaoyan 2012), "We benefited 
in three ways from the IBM acquisition. We got the ThinkPad brand, IBM's 
more advanced PC manufacturing technology and the company's international 
resources, such as its global sales channels and operation teams. These three 
elements have shored up our sales revenue in the past several years.” 
ThinkPad is treated as the number one benefit from the acquisition. 
Co-branding. In addition to co-branding with the Think Series brand, 
co-branding with IBM might have been another source of the gains in 
Lenovo’s brand equity. The acquisition was planned as a phased process, such 
that Lenovo could continue using IBM’s logo on Think Series PCs for five 
years. However, Lenovo stopped using IBM’s logo in the fourth year. 
λ2, λ3, and λ4 are the effects of co-branding with both the IBM and Think 
Series brands, and λ5 can be interpreted as the effect of co-branding with the 
 40 
 
Think Series brand alone. λ5 is very close to λ2, λ3, and λ4, though statistically 
smaller. Thus, we conclude that brand equity gain mainly comes from 
co-branding with Think Series, and brand “Think Series” was independent of 
the IBM brand. Consumers bought Think Series PCs, mainly because of the 
“Think” brand itself, not because of its association with the “IBM” brand. This 
may explain why Lenovo dropped the “IBM” logo nearly two years earlier 
than it was scheduled to do so. 
Nonlinear effect of time. We reported results based on a linear time trend. 
We also tried to use dummies for the 32 quarters, and found that many of the 
coefficients for the quarter dummies could not be precisely estimated.  
CONCLUSION AND FURTHER STUDY 
In this paper, we examine the role of consumers in the M&As. We 
develop a conceptual framework to evaluate how M&As affect the intrinsic 
preferences of consumers for the firms involved in M&As, and how changes 
in intrinsic brand preferences affect firm profits through three different 
mechanisms: brand equity, cost synergies, and changes in the product portfolio. 
We use structural modelling and counterfactual experiments to quantify the 
total profit impact and decompose the effect into each of the three mechanisms 
and their interaction effects, allowing us to assess the relative contribution of 
each mechanism. 
Empirically, we assess the impact of Lenovo’s acquisition of IBM’s PC 
division in China. The results demonstrate that the acquisition helped Lenovo 
significantly more than other firms. The acquisition significantly increased the 
intrinsic preference of consumers for Lenovo, and the acquisition also helped 
Lenovo achieve significant cost synergies. In the meantime, competition 
between LBG and TBG decreased. The merged firm’s profit was boosted 
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considerably. We also find that Lenovo did not lose its market share after the 
acquisition, whereas the other Chinese vendors did. Meanwhile, the 
acquisition somewhat shielded Lenovo from competition and distinguished it 
from its main competitors. 
We find that the gains in brand equity were the most important contributor 
to the increase in Lenovo’s profit. Cost synergies were the second-most 
important factor, followed by the changes in the product portfolio. The relative 
contribution of the three mechanisms seems to suggest that in a market with 
fierce competition, maintaining higher margins by enhancing consumer brand 
preferences and reducing marginal costs is a better strategy for increasing 
profits than expanding one’s product portfolio. This can shed light on other 
M&As. In 2014, Lenovo acquired IBM’s low-end servers in the hope of 
leveraging IBM’s branding. Lenovo has also tried to expand by entering the 
tablet market. It might be better for it to acquire a strong brand that has 
independent equity and does not have strong associations with its 
manufacturer than acquiring an entire manufacturer. Our findings also suggest 
that firms can leverage consumer preferences in the M&A process to increase 
profit. They can actively manage and enhance consumer preferences by 
advertising the positive spillovers in product quality.  
Due to data limitations, we only examined the PC market in one country 
where the acquiring firm was a strong player with strong brand recognition, 
thus the conclusions may not apply to other markets if the acquiring brand is a 
weak player. However, our approach can be easily applied to other industries 
and other markets. Studying other markets to generalize the findings would be 
a valuable exercise. One extension is to delineate the contexts in which brand 
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equity and cost synergies are more important, and how these are related to the 
level of competitiveness in the industry.  
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Appendix Lenovo’s Stock Price Change after the Acquisition 
 
 
 
